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Abstract The lack of economic sustainability of most healthcare systems and a
higher demand for quality and safety has contributed to the development of regu-
lation as a decisive factor for modernisation, innovation and competitiveness in the
health sector. The aim of this paper is to determine the importance of the principle
of public accountability in healthcare regulation, stressing the fact that sunshine
regulation—as a direct and transparent control over health activities—is vital for an
effective regulatory activity, for an appropriate supervision of the different agents,
to avoid quality shading problems and for healthy competition in this sector.
Methodologically, the authors depart from Kieran Walshe’s regulatory theory that
foresees healthcare regulation as an instrument of performance improvement and
they articulate this theory with the different regulatory strategies. The authors
conclude that sunshine regulation takes on a special relevance as, by promoting
publicity of the performance indicators, it contributes directly and indirectly to an
overall improvement of the healthcare services, namely in countries were citizens
are more critical with regard to the overall performance of the system. Indeed,
sunshine regulation contributes to the achievement of high levels of transparency,
which are fundamental to overcoming some of the market failures that are inevitable
in the transformation of a vertical and integrated public system into a decentralised
network where entrepreneurialism appears to be the predominant culture.
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The lack of economic sustainability of the healthcare systems in many developed
countries and a higher demand for quality and safety has contributed to the
development of regulation as a decisive factor for modernisation, innovation and
competitiveness in the health sector [25].
Regulation has two essential aspects in the health sector. It intends to guarantee
appropriate competition, namely in the context of a quasi-market where different
providers apply for the public ﬁnancing of their healthcare activities. The
government by contracts is the paradigm of this type of service, where the
guarantee of the quality of the services offered is more important than the
institutional nature of the providers [12]. The economic regulation intends to correct
the market failures in this sector which need constant and persistent supervision:
namely, information asymmetry, externalities, service scarcity, market uncertainty
and monopoly creation. Healthcare regulation intends also to safeguard the basic
rights of the citizens, namely in what concerns the practice of cream-skimming or
even the induced demand of healthcare that leads inevitably to over treatment. The
social regulation is then an instrument that afﬁrms the basic rights of the patients.
The main objective of this paper is to determine the importance of the principle
of public accountability in healthcare regulation, stressing the fact that sunshine
regulation is vital for an effective regulatory activity, for an appropriate supervision
of different providers, to avoid quality shading problems and for healthy
competition in this sector. Methodologically, the authors depart from Kieran
Walshe’s [26] regulatory theory that foresees healthcare regulation as an instrument
of performance improvement and they articulate this theory with different
regulatory strategies. Although this theory acknowledges four key characteristics
that are central to the nature of regulation—formal remit, centralisation, third party
accountability and action in the public interest—independence can only be achieved
if there are appropriate mechanisms for public and stakeholder accountability.
This is probably the innovative contribution of this paper because sunshine
regulation and the role of public accountability in this setting should be stressed as a
major factor of improvement in healthcare and of empowerment of society. A
secondary objective is to demonstrate that sunshine regulation works whatever the
regulatory strategy followed. The authors try to ﬁnd out if compliance, deterrence or
responsive strategies are better off with accountability as a main driver of success in
healthcare regulation.
Accountability and Regulatory Strategy
The high complexity of the healthcare system has contributed to the need for
effective accountability by the healthcare providers so that two essential objectives
in the health sector are achieved [18] namely to promote a healthy competition
among the operators and to achieve important social values such as the right to
information and to freedom of choice. To achieve these objectives, the application
of the principle of public accountability is essential to ﬁght against the existence of
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organisations. Namely evidence-based performance indicators (social, economical
and quality) are necessary to fulﬁl these objectives.
The term accountability refers to the need to make the decision process in
healthcare visible and transparent as well as to the method for achieving this
objective. At all levels of the healthcare system important decisions are taken with
regard to the quantity and the way in which the resources are used. According to
Norman Daniels the manner in which these decisions are made is an important way
for evaluating the fairness of a health system [10]. This means, each citizen has the
right to know the underlying drivers of the decision-making process and,
furthermore, to be an active partner in this process [8]. This partnership implies
that information asymmetry is reduced through the informed consent practice,
although the patient/physician relationship will always be directed by professional
values. Regulation can play a major role in this setting by guaranteeing that patients
are informed of their clinical conditions. At a macro level it refers to the concept of
‘‘democratic and transparent process’’ and to promoting the participation of the
society who, in accordance with unanimously shared values, has the required
wisdom to decide on this as well as on other areas of social importance.
The term ‘‘accountability’’ has, from the point of view of political philosophy,
two distinct though related aspects. By public accountability we understand the duty
to involve both the society in general as well as the citizen in particular in the
decisions related to healthcare. Thus the organisations are obliged to provide data
and indicators so that the citizen may be free to make informed choices [9].
Democratic accountability refers to the process by which the health institutions—
whether it is the Government, a hospital or an individual provider—account to
society [7]. This may involve the drawing up of periodic reports, the execution of
internal and external audits, or even the justiﬁcation of a determined course of
action, namely when the adoption of guidelines in clinical practice is at stake. In
Table 1 the different levels of the implementation of accountability are presented.
Accountability also refers to the principle of autonomy, not only at the individual
level but also collectively; social autonomy in relation to the institutions with (or
without) democratic legitimacy and the promotion of the right to information of one
and all citizens. There does not seem to be a real alternative, since in a plural and
democratic society, no manager can meet the expectations of the various cultural
groups, an indispensable factor to promote social cohesion. Thus, for example, on
deciding to allocate resources for a clinical intervention that beneﬁts a wide segment
of the population disregarding another treatment that beneﬁts only a small minority
(orphan diseases for instance), the only fair process is the resort to deliberative
democracy through the active and informed participation of the society. Progres-
sively, the systematic consultation with an informed public, its involvement in
critical decisions and the establishment of partnerships in the decision-making
processes, exemplify the reactive nature of the citizens on decisions about the health
policy. Fairness, from a Rawlsian perspective [20, 21], means that the empower-
ment of society and the subsequent social choices comply with the principle of
equal opportunities. It follows that deliberative democracy should abide to
fundamental values of liberal democracies and the rights of minorities must always
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through the active role of patient advocacy groups, a fundamental step in modern
societies for scrutinising many government decisions.
The different accountability levels, from the individual provider to the top
manager of the healthcare system, are related to the different types of society’s
participation in the democratic process. And, as Norman Daniels suggests [29] ‘‘one
aspect of public accountability is to undertake careful, scientiﬁc assessments of the
performance of the system as a whole and its various components. Public reporting
of these outcome measures is likely to be perceived as threatening to some interests.
But a reﬁnement of this sort of evaluation is an essential mechanism for improving
the system and relying on consumer choices to force such improvements in quality’’
(p. 58). Many healthcare agents, individual practitioners, as well as institutions and
healthcare plans, have speciﬁc interests that call for encryption. However, in the
long run, the inevitable competition in the healthcare sector implies that both quality
and economic performance indicators are publicly accessible. The availability of
this kind of data on the internet for public consultation is an example of the
importance of the principle of public accountability. Such a practice was
implemented both by the British Care Quality Commission as well as by the
Portuguese Regulatory Authority of Health.
Table 1 Different levels of public accountability (Adapted from Daniels 1996)
I. Macro level: Government, parliament, and/or other democratic institutions
1. Explicit deliberative procedures for resource allocation with transparency and rationales for
decisions based on reasons all ‘‘stakeholders’’ can agree;
2. Global budgeting;
3. Measures for enforcement of compliance with rules and laws (regulation);
4. Strengthening civil society enabling environment for advocacy groups;
5. Stimulating public debate, including participation of vulnerable groups;
6. Fair grievance procedures: Legal procedures (malpractice) and non-legal dispute resolution
procedures.
II. Meso level: Healthcare departments, health insurers, private institutions (For proﬁt and not-for-proﬁt)
1. Explicit, public detailed procedures for evaluating services with full public reports;
2. Use reports;
3. Performance reports and compliance reports;
4. Use of adequately qualiﬁed consultants;
5. External and internal audit;
6. Fair grievance procedures: Legal procedures (malpractice) and non-legal dispute resolution
procedures.
III. Micro level: healthcare professionals
1. Informed consent;
2. Evidence-based guidelines;
3. Openness of the decision-making process;
4. Adequate privacy protection;
5. Integrity and absence of dual role
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institutional nature both in a true healthcare market and in a virtual competitive
market. However, for sunshine regulation to be effective the principle of public
accountability should be considered by any regulatory strategy. Classically, there
are two principal models of intervention of regulatory activity. Compliance, which
means generating the operators’ agreement to the regulator’s objectives, and
deterrence, which suggests a coercive attitude hindering performance, appealing to
the mechanisms legally established for this purpose. The two models and the
corresponding regulatory strategies are not mutually exclusive, quite on the
contrary. Moreover, there are some organisations that comply with voluntary codes
of conduct. Nevertheless, different realities originate the need to use the models in a
casuistic manner [13]. The healthcare market’s atomicity should lead, in principle,
to intervention at the deterrence level, due to the regulator’s difﬁculty in supervising
all the providers. For instance, the numerous physicians’ ofﬁces in a liberal regime;
while, on the other hand, the existence of a reduced number of operators is more
predisposed for compliance.
The expected consequences of the action also deserve a different model of
approach. For example, while adverse patient selection and cream-skimming should
deserve a ﬁrm and determined intervention, possibly resorting to legal sanctions,
other milder deviations should only be subject to regulatory prevention. So, the
choice of the regulatory model is related to the existence of a set of conditions
favourable for the production of effective results [24]. The compliance model
applies to providers with a strong ethical and organisational culture, but it is well
proven that these organisations are not always effective in complying with their
objectives, or efﬁcient in resource allocation. This model speciﬁcally requires
guidelines, codes of conduct, statements of rights and general recommendations for
certain performance standards to be complied with. An inconvenience of the
systematic implementation of compliance, as a regulatory operational model, is the
likelihood of the development of the phenomenon known as creative compliance.
Creative compliance refers to the possibility of developing a formal adjustment
between the regulatory objectives and the regulators’ practices, without the required
compensation with regards to performance improvement [3]. That is to say, an
undesirable consequence of the compliance model is the apparent compliance with
the recommendations issued, generating added costs for the healthcare organisation
without the corresponding change in its organisational culture. The institution
adapts with a great deal of creativity to the required standard, without the evidence
of improvement in the performance or quality of the services rendered. The
regulated organisation’s strategy may, eventually, entail the formal compliance of
the recommendations issued by the regulator, underestimating the adjustment to
new requirements of the healthcare system. For this reason, it is understood that
compliance is in itself not an effective healthcare regulatory model; however, and
although other supervising mechanisms are also necessary, the more publicity there
is on the activity of the healthcare providers the more probable will the success of
this model be. Public accountability is therefore a driver to a compliance strategy.
So compliance should not be underestimated as a dissuasion tool for condem-
nable practices. Even less should it be considered as a type of ‘‘soft regulation’’. In a
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123framework of supervision, the power of prevention and early intervention has, as in
other areas of the social and economic activity, an important role in the regulatory
system. However, compliance as a regulatory strategy will be much more effective
if the operators provide publicly the required information; and therefore, it might
not be necessary to resort to more aggressive sanction mechanisms and practices
(deterrence).
The deterrence model is specially intended for providers that are predisposed to
do everything they can to achieve their goals [6]. The structural reform of the
healthcare system contributed to a highly competitive environment, with consid-
erable ﬁnancial investments and progressively low proﬁt margins. With the opening
of the public healthcare system to private operators (for-proﬁt and not-for-proﬁt),
and the corporatisation of hospitals and primary care, the competition for the health
market may generate dysfunctions that clearly need to be regulated. Moreover, it is
probable that in these cases public accountability can be manipulated according to
the interests of the healthcare providers.
The ideal regulatory strategy seeks to integrate both perspectives. It is a third
model that aims at a systematic balance between compliance and deterrence. This
combined model is called responsive regulation [1]. Thus, a graded hierarchy of
responses for non-compliance with the recommendations and directions of the
regulating entity develops. This enforcement pyramid intends to develop the
regulators’ capacity to adapt to the current circumstances (Fig. 1). The adopted
model is not static but rather dynamic, depending on the various circumstantial
factors.
Responsive regulation presupposes that cultural diversity between regulated
organisations justiﬁes the use of a discriminatory power. That is, the organisations
are distinct and, as such, should be dealt with in a differentiated way. Since
contingency is the base of this model, hierarchy in the use of regulatory tools is
PERSUASION,I NCENTIVE POLICY,G OOD PRACTICE RECOGNITION,
COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION STRATEGY
CIVIL PROSECUTION,R EPEAT INSPECTIONS,R EFERRAL 
TO OTHER AGENCIES 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION,R EPEAT INSPECTIONS,
MONETARY SANCTIONS 
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS,I NFORMAL INTERVENTIONS,
FOLLOW-UP INSPECTIONS 
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OR LIMITATION 
TO ACTIVITY 
REMOVAL OF LICENSE
Fig. 1 Responsive regulation (Adapted from Ayres and Braithwaite) [1]
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123fundamental. It is not possible to consider a standard use. To effectively regulate
organisations’ practices an evaluation of each particular situation is justiﬁed
followed by the intervention with the appropriate regulatory instruments. It is
possible then to grade regulation measuring instruments since the latter have a more
signiﬁcant weight, both in ﬁnancial resources and in technical and material
resources, when the organisations’ performance is weak. This notion is related, in
part, to the concept of empowerment associated with regulation.
That is, an effective regulatory system should be developed with the purpose of
improving the performance level of the organisations, with characteristics such as
contingency and hierarchy contributing decisively. The entities responsible for
regulation resort to distinct mechanisms depending on the organisations’ perfor-
mance level and collaboration with regulatory authorities [2]. When there are
signals that show ‘‘bad’’ behaviour which puts compliance at risk, correction
measures will be introduced and these will increase whenever there seems to be lack
of efﬁciency in the ‘‘milder’’ measures. The lack of accountability is one of the
reasons that leads necessarily to a reinforcement of the regulatory instruments and,
therefore, of deterrence as a regulatory strategy.
At the base of the pyramid there are recommendations and guidelines
indicating the standard to be followed by the regulated entities. These will be for
more frequent and general use in the regulatory activity. It is fundamental that all
regulatory instruments and the regulators’ discretionary power are subject to some
moderation by criteria, such as prudence, transparency and accountability.
Furthermore, the adopted procedures should be standardised and grounded on
coherence and consistency, so that the innovating nature of the regulator is not
confused with lack of determination. This means that an integrated vision of the
objectives of the healthcare regulation and of the means to achieve it is an
important stimulus for the regulatory activity. Especially responsive regulation
depends on the systematic application of accountability arrangements so that it is
possible to achieve an effective sunshine regulation and, in this manner, allow the
introduction of new governance models more concerned with the citizens’
interests [27].
Sunshine Regulation in Healthcare
The successive reforms in the healthcare systems of the developed countries have in
common the fact that maximising efﬁciency is considered a factor as important as
the guarantee of adequate performance levels in the access to and quality of
healthcare [23]. Besides these important drivers of the reform of healthcare
institutions, the liberal democracies, namely European countries, resort to other
criteria, namely, the fact that the healthcare system should take into consideration
citizens’ perceived needs. Responsiveness is then a fundamental factor of any
healthcare reform in the attempt to incorporate the citizens’ expectations in the main
features of the reform. Nevertheless, responsiveness, or rather the capacity to meet
the citizens’ wishes, is normally confronted with a problem of information
asymmetry due to the speciﬁcity of the economic good at issue. It is especially
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and an adequate regulatory framework can effectively draw these distinctions as
long as the rationale for prioritising is fair and publicly accountable.
Healthcare regulation is rising steadily in many countries and for different
reasons. In particular economic, social, political and organizational causes paved the
way to stronger healthcare regulation. An example of this evolution is the creation
in April 2009 of the British Care Quality Commission. Both in healthcare systems
based mainly on the competitive market, such as the US system, and in the public
systems such as the National Health Service, the regulatory framework has
developed signiﬁcantly in the last years, at least in part because competition exists
almost everywhere. The search for efﬁciency may easily cause malfunctioning of
the healthcare services that needs to be regulated and supervised [4]. Diverse
institutional formats are acceptable with different degrees of independence in
relation to the Government [17]. Indeed without regulation the risk of providers’
abuse is higher as they take advantage of their dominant position or market power,
providing services of lower quality and higher prices. So, what is really at issue is a
change of paradigm, according to which the concept of State itself is questioned so
that it is possible to implement the statutory regulation in various sectors of the
economic activity. This evolution took place in the majority of the OECD
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries and is a
central element in the development of the Regulatory State [15, 16]. However, the
main issue is to determine if regulation really works and how its main objectives
may be achieved. As stated by Kieran Walshe four key characteristics are central to
the nature and purpose of regulation (p. 20–21):
Formal remit or acknowledge authority. In any system of regulation, the
regulator has to have some kind of formal remit to regulate that is
acknowledged by other stakeholders, most obviously the organizations being
regulated. …
Centralisation of oversight. Regulation represents a centralization of respon-
sibility, power and oversight in the regulator … The regulator is regulating on
behalf of others such as corporate purchasers, funders, consumer groups,
individual consumers and wider society, who cede some powers to the
regulator in exchange for an undertaking, implicit or explicit, that the regulator
will act in their interests …
Third-party accountability. As a result of the centralisation referred to above,
the regulator is always a third party to market transactions or inter-
organizational relationships. In a market setting, the regulator is a third party
to market transactions, providing a framework within which they take place
and acting to constrain the actions of buyers and sellers. In non-market settings
the regulator is still a third party to the inter-organizational relationships and
accountability arrangements. There will always be some kind of reporting,
performance management or accountability chain through which an organi-
zation is overseen, but the regulator sits outside that chain of command or
bureaucratic hierarchy.
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some wider societal goals, often established or expressed by the government’’
[30].
The authors will focus specially on the need for accountability by the provider;
this means they will stress the importance of sunshine regulation. Accountability
(public display) and benchmarking (regular comparison) of a set of performance
indicators promotes a yardstick for competition between providers and leads to
performance improvement. In general, there are two essential aspects that
characterize a transparent and accountable regulation:
1. Application of benchmarking: Through the comparison of a set of performance
indicators it is possible to compare the economic, ﬁnancial and quality results of
various healthcare providers. The star rating of hospitals implemented by
regulatory agencies is an example of this benchmarking;
2. Public discussion of performance: The application of the principle of public
accountability implies that the results of the benchmarking analysis are made
public and scrutinized by society. In this manner, freedom of choice and
competition in the healthcare system are promoted as well as the citizens’
empowerment.
Public accountability is, more than a performance principle, the main driver of a
new culture in the health sector; independently of the degree of the State’s
intervention and the introduction of the market rules, it needs to be applied
effectively so that the objectives of the healthcare system are fully achieved. In
particular, the sunshine regulation depends largely on the implementation of this
principle as it is not possible, without accurate data, to scrutinize the activity of the
healthcare providers. The existence of an appropriate and modern regulatory system
is thus an instrumental factor for the global improvement of the healthcare system
and, consequently, of the population’s health outcomes.
A crucial aspect of the sunshine regulation is the comparative benchmarking
analysis between the healthcare providers. We quote as an example the star rating
promoted by the British Care Quality Commission and by the Portuguese
Regulatory Authority of Health. The star rating is an example of hierarchisation
of relative quality that, according to the principle of public accountability, provides
simple and objective information to society (generally in four different levels of
hierarchy) on the global performance level of the organization.
In England the rating system was initially promoted by the Health Care
Commission, now transformed into Care Quality Commission, and was based in
performance indicators giving star ratings to NHS hospital trusts [11]. A wide
range of indicators was selected including waiting times for general practitioner
referral to ﬁrst outpatient appointments, vacancies in medical stafﬁng and the
percentage of patients waiting on trolleys for more than 4 h. The indicators are
related to a speciﬁc set of key targets designed to reﬂect a wide range of
performance issues, following consultation with the service and other stakehold-
ers. The overall performance rating of an NHS trust is made up of a number of
performance indicators that show how trusts are doing in relation to some of the
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performance.
Both the lists of indicators as well as the technical speciﬁcations used to calculate
them are published in advance on the website. In short the NHS performance ratings
system places trusts in England in one of four categories: 0 stars (poor quality), 1
star (adequate quality), 2 stars (good quality) and 3 stars (excellent quality). To
ensure that evidence is consistently interpreted a set of guidelines—called key lines
of regulatory assessment (KLORA)—are used. As stated at the website of the Care
Quality Commission (www.cqc.org.uk) ‘‘we apply these guidelines to help us form
a judgement about how well your service is meeting each of the outcome groups in
the national minimum standards. Our primary concern is to assess the quality of
outcomes that people who use your service experience. Once we have used KLORA
to reach a judgement about each outcome area of the national minimum standards,
we apply a set of rules to calculate the overall quality rating for your service’’. It
should be emphasised that in Britain commissioners are also subjected to some sort
of rating, via World Class Commissioning.
More recently the system has evolved and trusts are assessed in three different
dimensions: (a) core standards: standards concerned with safety and cleanliness,
safeguarding children, infection control, dignity and respect, and privacy and
conﬁdentiality; (b) existing commitments: indicators concerned with waiting times
for inpatient and outpatient treatment, and ambulance response times; and (c)
national priorities: indicators concerned with patient reported experience of
services, infection rates, waiting times for cancer treatment, and a range of public
health measures. Also, other trusts, such as primary care and mental health trusts,
have also received full star ratings. In 2008/2009 all 392 NHS trusts in England
were given an annual rating. These can broadly be broken down into ﬁve different
types of trust, as follows: (a) 169 acute and specialist trusts; (b) 152 primary care
trusts; (c) 57 mental health trusts; (d) 11 ambulance trusts; and (e) 3 learning
disability and other trusts.
A major issue to be considered, however, is to examine the evolution of the
performance indicators over time. This evaluation unequivocally is the outcome of
the sunshine regulatory method adopted. In Table 2 the performance indicators
scores of the English star rating are presented and a signiﬁcant evolution of the
overall quality scores can be observed. It implies also a signiﬁcant performance
improvement. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that, at least in part, sunshine
regulation did play an important role in this evolution.
Similarly, in Portugal the National System of Health Evaluation intends to
guarantee appropriate quality standards of the healthcare services through the
benchmarking of a set of quality indicators that will subsequently lead to the relative
grading of the healthcare providers. The subsequent social pressure, based on the
analysis of this data, makes it possible to reduce the information asymmetry as well
as to improve the consumer sovereignty indicators, which for different sorts of
reasons are deeply reduced in the healthcare sector. As in England the determination
of the performance indicators is essential for the proper application of public
accountability and for an efﬁcient regulation of these activities.
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Authority of Health has the intention of applying this model (following the UK
example). It is expected that the National System of Health Evaluation will be
applied in 2011 and different regulatory strategies in the healthcare sector will be
reinterpreted according to this perspective of sunshine regulation. In this manner,
the sunshine regulation fulﬁls a double objective. In areas of general economic
interest it offers an effective economic regulation by stimulating healthy compe-
tition in the quasi market of healthcare and, on the other hand, it delivers an
appreciable social regulation by providing the public with simpliﬁed, clear and
objective knowledge on the quality of the healthcare services.
Conclusion
The healthcare systems of the industrialised countries are confronted with important
challenges due to the rise in healthcare costs and the subsequent lack of ﬁnancial
sustainability [19]. The convergence of various factors, specially, the demographic
transition, will create the need for considerable creativity to overcome the inevitable
economic pressures that the social protection systems will encounter. The
introduction of quasi markets in healthcare is the reﬂection of this evolution [14]
and this reformist course should be properly supervised in order to protect important
social values. An example of this transformation is the creation of Foundation
Trusts (not-for-proﬁt, public beneﬁt corporations) that have closer community links
and are therefore more distanced from Government than other NHS bodies [28].
That is, management models are to be found that will not only incorporate the
market rules [22] but also allow the implementation of principles and values
protected in the modern societies such as accountability or responsiveness in
accordance with communities’ interests.
In this manner, sunshine regulation takes on a special relevance as, by promoting
publicity of the performance indicators and of the decision-making processes, it
contributes directly and indirectly for an overall improvement of the healthcare
system. Indeed, sunshine regulation contributes to the achievement of high levels of
Table 2 Comparison of overall quality scores
Overall quality scores Excellent Good Fair Weak
2008/2009 overall quality scores—number of trusts
assessed = 392
59 (15%) 186 (47%) 127 (32%) 20 (5%)
2007/2008 overall quality scores—number of trusts
assessed = 391
100 (26%) 138 (35%) 131 (34%) 22 (6%)
2006/2007 overall quality scores—number of trusts
assessed = 394
65 (16%) 121 (31%) 175 (44%) 33 (8%)
2005/2006 overall quality scores—number of trusts
assessed = 570
25 (4%) 207 (36%) 286 (50%) 52 (9%)
Source: NHS ratings 2006–2009, Care Quality Commission [5]
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123transparency, which are fundamental to overcome some of the market failures that
are inevitable in the transformation of a vertical and integrated public system, in a
decentralised network where entrepreneurialism appears to be the predominant
culture.
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